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I 
INTRODUCTION 
This symposium addresses an emerging but little-studied field of legal the-
ory and practice:  Global Administrative Law.  It is the first in a series of jour-
nal symposia produced by the ongoing Global Administrative Law Research 
Project, based at NYU Law School.1  By way of overview, we set out in this 
Foreword some core elements of the concept of Global Administrative Law 
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that animates this symposium; these ideas are developed in greater detail in the 
framing paper by Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart.2  We then note briefly some of 




The concept of Global Administrative Law begins from the twin ideas that 
much global governance can be understood as administration, and that such 
administration is often organized and shaped by principles of an administrative 
law character.  The contemporary starting point is thus the rapidly changing 
pattern of transnational regulation and its administration, a pattern that now 
ranges from regulation-by-non-regulation (laissez faire), through formal self-
regulation (such as by some industry associations), hybrid private-private regu-
lation (for example, business–NGO partnerships in the Fair Labor Association), 
hybrid public–private regulation (for instance, in mutual recognition arrange-
ments where a private agency in one country tests products to certify compli-
ance with governmental standards of another country), network governance by 
state officials (as in the work of the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) on environmental policies to be followed by na-
tional export credit agencies), inter-governmental organizations with significant 
but indirect regulatory powers (for example, regulation of ozone depleting sub-
stances under the Montreal Protocol), and inter-governmental organizations 
with direct governance powers (as with determinations by the Office of the 
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees of individuals’ refugee status, or the 
WTO dispute resolution system for trade conflicts).  Bodies that were not origi-
nally envisaged as regulators have increasingly become so.  The U.N. Security 
Council now regulates movements of arms, food and money in areas subject to 
sanctions, and lists specific individuals whose assets are to be frozen by states 
under anti-terrorism rules.  The World Bank supervises developing countries in 
their adoption and implementation of very detailed externally-devised stan-
dards for matters ranging from the structure of insurance markets to the con-
duct of environmental assessments.  The Forest Stewardship Council, a private 
entity, has developed detailed sets of criteria for sustainable forest use, and for 
certification of products from such forests.  These evolving regulatory structures 
are each confronted with demands for transparency, consultation, participation, 
reasoned decisions, and review mechanisms to promote accountability.  These 
demands, and responses to them, are increasingly framed in terms that have an 
administrative law character.  The growing commonality of these administrative 
law-type principles and practices is building a unity between otherwise dispa-
rate areas of governance.  The sense that there is some unity of proper princi-
 
 2. Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administra-
tive Law, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (Summer/Autumn 2005). 
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ples and practices across these issue areas is of growing importance to the 
strengthening, or eroding, of legitimacy and effectiveness in these different gov-
ernance regimes. 
Instead of neatly separated levels of regulation, a congeries of different ac-
tors and different layers together form a variegated “global administrative 
space” that includes international institutions and transnational networks in-
volving both governmental and non-governmental actors, as well as domestic 
administrative bodies that operate within international regimes or cause trans-
boundary regulatory effects.  And, while norms of a regulatory character have 
been adopted by international treaties or intergovernmental agencies with great 
frequency since at least the nineteenth century, international administrative 
roles and capacities until recently evolved slowly (some important early cases 
excepted).  The impact of global regulatory norms on sophisticated domestic le-
gal and administrative systems was initially limited, because states retained the 
freedom to refuse ratification, and governments had considerable scope to 
shape the content and operation of the norms when implementing them 
through their own legislative and administrative structures.  Thus, while consti-
tutional and administrative checks operated within well-functioning national 
systems, only gradually were checks of comparable effectiveness considered as 
serious objectives in the structuring of transnational arrangements.  However, 
the separation between prevailing models of domestic and international regula-
tion has been eroding faster in practice than it has in the theory of administra-
tion.  Some international bodies, such as the Clean Development Mechanism 
under the Kyoto Protocol, now directly create and implement rights of indi-
viduals; other international bodies, especially regulatory networks such as the 
Basle Committee of central bankers or the OECD, are composed of domestic 
administrative officials whose duties now necessitate acting in global concert.  
Global rules and standards effectively determine the content of much domestic 
regulation, and thus significantly limit the freedom of domestic actors, in ways 
that may enhance or impair the success of domestic constitutional and adminis-
trative checks. These impacts might be especially acute for developing countries 
and for prosperous small states. 
The problems of legitimacy raised by this shift of power and authority to ex-
tra-state processes and norms are graphic and unresolved.  So too are the prob-
lems of configuring suitable democracy-respecting but functionally effective re-
lationships between national institutions (including national and sub-national 
administrative agencies and courts) and extra-national or private institutions of 
global governance. The Global Administrative Law Research Project seeks to 
tackle such problems from new angles, through its analysis of global governance 
as administrative action.  These angles include investigation of the applicability 
in global governance, whether through national or extra-national institutions, of 
tools and approaches developed in domestic administrative law to deal with 
problems of participation, transparency, accountability, and review.  They in-
clude also the construction of adapted or wholly new techniques and ap-
proaches that utilize basic administrative law ideas and values.  The contribu-
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tions to this symposium take up these problems from a variety of theoretical 
perspectives, and examine the practical issues arising in different types of global 
regulatory institutions and regulatory subject areas that have usually been stud-
ied in relative isolation from each other. 
The mechanisms of national administrative law vary significantly from coun-
try to country, but some general elements are discernible, particularly with re-
gard to transparency and accountability in decisionmaking.  These include re-
quirements for notice, consultation, and open procedures that allow directly 
affected actors and a broader public to participate; requirements of reasoned 
decision in accordance with basic principles of administrative fairness and ra-
tionality; and review mechanisms, often of a judicial nature.  Administrative law 
can both check and steer the exercise of government power: by both protecting 
individuals against unauthorized or arbitrary exercises of official power, and 
also promoting administrative responsiveness to broader public interests, these 
elements form an integral part of democratic systems and, more generally, en-
sure a basic form of accountability of public power.  In an appropriately modi-
fied form, they may perform a similar function for global administrative struc-
tures.  The impetus for adopting measures of this sort usually comes from 
efforts by leading actors in global administrative regimes to improve internal 
accountability and bolster external legitimacy.  Such efforts are often stimulated 
by external criticism, and in some cases also by pressures exerted by domestic 
courts, which may threaten to review the decisions of global regulatory bodies 
or of national agencies implementing such global decisions. 
Administrative law mechanisms are indeed emerging in many different ar-
eas of global governance.  They are seen in U.N. responses to the hesitant en-
gagement of domestic courts in reviewing Security Council sanctions against in-
dividuals; in the Inspection Panel set up by the World Bank to ensure its own 
compliance with its internal policies; in notice-and-comment procedures 
adopted by international standard-setters such as the Basle Committee or the 
OECD; in the inclusion of NGOs in regulatory bodies like the Codex Alimen-
tarius Commission; in rules about foreign participation in domestic administra-
tive procedures as set out in the Aarhus Convention; or in the review of domes-
tic administrative procedures and decisions by international panels in the WTO 
context.  The pattern that emerges from these and other, often embryonic 
mechanisms is not yet coherent: such mechanisms and principles operate in 
some areas and not in others, and diverge widely in their forms.  Yet the overall 
picture is of widespread, and growing, commitment both to principles of trans-
parency, participation, reasoned decision and review in global governance, and 
to tempered but reasoned principles related to protecting security information, 
commercial confidentiality, and negotiating effectiveness.  A certain lack of co-
herence in these developments reflects experimentation, adaptation, and eclec-
ticism across the heterogeneous terrain of global administrative space.  This is 
beginning to give rise to exchanges and mutual learning among practitioners 
and scholars of the different fields.  We argue that this is a general trend of 
practice toward a Global Administrative Law. 
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In short, Global Administrative Law encompasses the legal mechanisms, 
principles, and practices, along with supporting social understandings, that 
promote or otherwise affect the accountability of global administrative bodies, 
in particular by ensuring these bodies meet adequate standards of transparency, 
consultation, participation, rationality, and legality, and by providing effective 
review of the rules and decisions these bodies make.  These global administra-
tive bodies include intergovernmental institutions, informal inter-governmental 
networks, national governmental agencies acting pursuant to global norms, hy-
brid public–private bodies engaged in transnational administration, and purely 
private bodies performing public roles in transnational administration.  This 
field of law is described as “global” rather than “international” to reflect both 
the inclusion in it of a large array of informal institutional arrangements (many 
involving prominent roles for non-state actors), and its foundation in normative 
practices, and normative sources, that are not encompassed within standard 
conceptions of “international law.” 
III 
KEY QUESTIONS 
We delineate five sets of questions that are essential to the study of Global 
Administrative Law.  The first set is primarily empirical and analytical: it asks 
what administrative law mechanisms are actually emerging in global govern-
ance, how they differ from one area to another, and how they relate to the dif-
ferent structures of global regulatory regimes. 
A second set relates to doctrinal issues: it seeks to explore whether and to 
what extent the mechanisms of global administrative governance reflect legal 
rules or principles of participation, transparency or review, and how far they 
reach.  Further, what are the sources of any such rules and principles?  Can they 
be accounted for by received doctrines of the sources of international law?  Can 
global administrative law emerge and attain effective status without a global ju-
diciary to adopt, interpret and apply such doctrine; or will a global network of 
tribunals, domestic and international, emerge to play just this role? 
Thirdly, we emphasize the importance of normative questions about Global 
Administrative Law, which may challenge the general merits or specific framing 
of this concept, and may raise critical objections to the potential impact of such 
an approach.  This calls for debate on the contending normative bases for 
Global Administrative Law, including on its effects on social welfare, and espe-
cially on its relationship to democracy and to justice.  Should Global Adminis-
trative Law embody a commitment to substantive reasonableness, encouraging 
rejection or rethinking or justification on other grounds of policies that reduce 
social welfare, and promoting policies that increase social welfare?  Is Global 
Administrative Law dependent on a democratic framework, or can it operate 
(with perhaps more limited functions) outside democratic contexts?  (Does this 
question depend on the level of governance, because majoritarian democracy is 
more pertinent at the national level?  And does it depend on the type of democ-
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racy envisioned—direct, representative, participatory, majoritarian, qualified 
majoritarian, subject to countermajoritarian rights, or otherwise?)  Will the 
spread of global administrative law, particularly its aspirations to accountability 
and participation, itself help promote democracy around the world?  Or, is it 
feasible or useful to bracket questions about democracy in the further develop-
ment of the field, at least for the moment, given that there is not a strong inter-
national consensus about democratic norms and institutional arrangements for 
global governance?  Questions about power and bias are also central: are ad-
ministrative law tools mostly Western concepts and thus reflections of very par-
ticular ideas about political orders that are currently being imposed on the less 
powerful, or do they bear a more universal promise?  Who will be the winners 
and losers from greater application of global administrative law? 
A fourth set of questions concerns the institutional design of administrative 
law mechanisms in global regimes.  Different models are competing: how 
should bottom-up mechanisms, centered on checks on global regulation by do-
mestic institutions, be balanced with top-down mechanisms in which the checks 
are institutionalized in or by global bodies?  To what extent is it feasible to 
transplant domestic models of administrative law to global regimes that are of-
ten characterized by strong informality, diffuse responsibilities, decisions based 
on consent or consensus, plural authority structures, powerful private actors, 
minimal centralized legislative or executive power, and the absence of strong 
independent courts?  Can Global Administrative Law prosper in global regimes 
that generally lack the conventional binding features of national legal institu-
tions, including majority rule and compulsory dispute resolution before an in-
dependent judiciary?  Given these features, is it more promising to look to ele-
ments of domestic administrative law that have emerged outside traditional 
command administration, such as systems based on voluntary opt-in or network 
negotiation and cooperation?3 
Fifth and finally, it is essential to ask questions of positive political theory.  
What are the factors that lead to (or hinder) the development of administrative 
law mechanisms in global regulation, and under what conditions are such 
mechanisms likely or unlikely to be successful?  For example, are forms of re-
view most likely to emerge and to be successful in situations where power is 
delegated by a principal to an agent?  Will Global Administrative Law be more 
likely to emerge as a response to the accretion of rules and adjudicative systems 
at the international level that bind those who have not consented to particular 
norms or decision (just as national administrative law has emerged in response 
to the expansion of the regulatory state), and less likely to emerge where global 
institutions adhere to traditional international rules of treaty-making and adju-
 
 3. On legal borrowing or transplantation from national to international law and attendant issues 
of institutional design, see Jonathan B. Wiener, Something Borrowed for Something Blue: Legal Trans-
plants and the Evolution of Global Environmental Law, 27 ECOL. L.Q. 1295 (2001).  
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dication only by consent?4  Who anticipates benefiting from such mechanisms 
and so has incentives to promote them?  Will such mechanisms be venues for 
social movements, such as those seeking change or seeking to resist elements of 
globalization, or will they favor corporate or other groups that can afford to 
take part in complicated administrative proceedings all over the world? 
IV 
SYMPOSIUM CONTRIBUTIONS 
These different questions are taken up in greater detail in the contributions 
to this volume. As previously noted, the framework essay by Kingsbury, Krisch, 
and Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law,5 develops the issues 
and themes outlined above in greater detail, drawing on a range of historical 
and contemporary sources and illustrations from different global administrative 
regimes.  It provides a more extensive overview of the emerging phenomena of 
Global Administrative Law, explains the different types of global administra-
tion that have emerged, examines in some detail the principal analytical, doc-
trinal, normative, institutional and positive political theoretical issues that they 
present, and thereby indicates a possible agenda for future research of the field. 
The essay is complemented by a substantial Global Administrative Law Bibli-
ography.6 
Following that framing paper, the next four papers address the development 
of global administrative law from the perspective of experts in national adminis-
trative law—in the United States, Europe, and common law Commonwealth 
systems such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand.  The remaining five papers 
focus on administrative law approaches in a variety of transborder or global 
governance regimes. 
Richard Stewart’s essay, U.S. Administrative Law: A Model for Global Ad-
ministrative Law?,7 considers two means by which U.S. administrative law con-
ceptions and tools might be applied to global regulatory regimes.  Under a “bot-
tom up” approach, he examines the difficulties faced by domestic political 
actors, litigants, and courts in dealing with the global elements in domestic ad-
ministrative decisions that implement or are shaped by regulatory norms 
adopted by global regulatory regimes.  He outlines three basic approaches that 
domestic courts might take when asked to review the global elements of such 
decisions:  They might treat them on a par with purely domestic decisions; or, 
they might impose less demanding administrative law disciplines out of defer-
ence to the need for executive flexibility in foreign affairs; finally, they might 
impose more demanding disciplines on such decisions because of accountability 
 
 4. See Jonathan B. Wiener, On the Political Economy of Global Environmental Regulation, 87 
GEO. L.J. 749 (1999). 
 5. 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (Summer/Autumn 2005). 
 6. 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 357 (Summer/Autumn 2005).  The bibliography is regularly updated 
at http://www.iilj.org/global_adlaw/index.htm. 
 7. 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (Summer/Autumn 2005). 
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gaps with regard to the global elements.  Stewart also considers how, under a 
“top down” approach, elements of U.S. administrative law might provide one 
set of approaches adaptable for use within global regimes.  In doing so, he pro-
vides a detailed analytical typology of global regulatory regimes and their ad-
ministrative components and comments on the different functions of adminis-
trative law in these different institutional contexts.  He concludes that Global 
Administrative Law will likely develop further through an iterative and some-
times confrontational interaction between “top down” and “bottom up” ap-
proaches. 
Sabino Cassese’s paper, Global Standards for National Administrative Pro-
cedure,8 provides a detailed analysis of some “top down” approaches, examining 
the influence of global norms of regulatory due process on domestic administra-
tions.  He examines ways in which global law operates in national legal systems 
through procedural principles and criteria as well as substantive standards. He 
takes as examples procedural norms of transparency, harmonization, equiva-
lence, and notification, and disciplines on national regulatory certification and 
control to prevent delay, discrimination, and arbitrary decisions. Cassese traces 
these rules not only to international treaties such as the SPS, TBT, and GATS 
Agreements, but also to the work of subsidiary administrative bodies such as 
the WTO committees under those agreements and the Codex Alementarius 
Commission and its committees.  He emphasizes that although these procedural 
norms are often not formally binding in the national legal order, trade agree-
ments give states substantial incentives to follow them.  Many of these proce-
dural norms have a strongly horizontal aspect; they encourage states to open 
their domestic regulatory regimes reciprocally by adoption of procedural rules 
to promote various forms of transnational regulatory dialogue and coordina-
tion.  Harmonization is encouraged, not imposed from on high (the WTO 
model thus differs from that of the E.U.).  Private actors are increasingly inter-
ested in these procedural rules and seek to use them to advance their interests. 
Cassese highlights the unsustainability of the traditional dichotomy between 
regulation of international administration by international law on the one hand 
and regulation of domestic administration by domestic administrative law on 
the other.  He warns, however, against uncritically transposing conceptions of 
domestic administrative law to the very different international institutional con-
text.  At the global level, administrative law is multipolar rather than hierarchi-
cal, enforcement capacity is weak, and the functions of administrative law are 
often very different than in domestic settings.  His analysis suggests that while 
many of the principles of administrative law developed in the domestic context 
may have relevance for global governance, their institutionalization and their 
regulative role must necessarily be very different across different global con-
texts. 
 
 8. 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109 (Summer/Autumn 2005). 
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In his paper, The Rule of (Administrative) Law in International Law,9 David 
Dyzenhaus draws on experience in several Commonwealth countries (Austra-
lia, Canada, England, and New Zealand) to present a natural law conception of 
the role of national judges in common law systems when dealing with global 
governance issues.  He finds that these judges review official acts of a tradition-
ally prerogative character for compliance with rule of law principles and inter-
national human rights norms that lack an explicit basis in positive law, taking as 
examples cases in which courts have overturned deportation decisions as con-
trary to international human rights norms even when these norms are not bind-
ing within the national legal system.  Dyzenhaus argues that these common law 
judges have been amenable to the influence of international law because they 
reject positivist assumptions that have led to the marginalization of interna-
tional law within domestic legal orders, and have accordingly been able to rec-
ognize international law norms as a component of the rule of law conceptions 
that they apply.  Dyzenhaus considers the current system by which states auto-
matically freeze the assets of persons listed—without notice or opportunity for 
hearing—by the Security Council’s 1267 Committee as terrorist financiers, and 
argues that this practice is contrary to rule-of-law principles as well as to prece-
dents established by Commonwealth courts in analogous cases.  He concludes 
that the natural law conceptions of the rule of law and international human 
rights reflected in these decisions apply fully to the international order itself, in-
cluding global regulatory regimes, as well as to domestic officials, and that in-
ternational law must become more institutionally mature by developing more 
adequate mechanisms to secure these rule of law and human rights norms. 
Janet McLean’s paper, Divergent Legal Conceptions of the State: Implica-
tions for Global Administrative Law,10 also looks at Canada, New Zealand, and 
the United States, but focuses attention on the implications of radical differ-
ences between the unified and eternal conception of the state in international 
law and the disaggregated and temporally contingent conception of the gov-
ernment prevalent in the national administrative law of these common law 
countries.  Whereas this disaggregated common law approach has facilitated ju-
dicial review of administrative action as a means to uphold a variety of court-
driven legal values (while also accommodating distinctive features of the par-
ticular polity), the unified approach of international law has led to individual 
states being treated as abstract units devoid of any special histories or distinc-
tive contemporary features.  She suggests that if this unified approach to the 
state is taken in the developing global administrative law, it will be difficult for 
useful substantive values and outcomes to be realized through global adminis-
trative law.  The opposition between the common law and international law ap-
proaches is perhaps being dissipated, as both national courts and global bodies 
confront the difficulties of applying administrative law to the proliferating range 
 
 9. 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127 (Summer/Autumn 2005). 
 10. 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167 (Summer/Autumn 2005). 
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of privatized entities, public–private partnerships, and private governance insti-
tutions within states and in global governance.  Although this proliferation 
makes for more seamless integration between these forms of national govern-
ance and global governance, the increasingly prevalent pattern of private or hy-
brid bodies in global governance paradoxically makes the effective pursuit of 
substantive values through global administrative law even more improbable. 
The group of papers dealing with administrative law regimes in specific 
transnational governance arrangements begins with James Salzman’s paper,  
Decentralized Administrative Law in the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development.11  In four cases studies, he documents some striking di-
vergences in approaches to participation, transparency, and accountability in 
different substantive areas of the work of a single organization.  These diver-
gences, which are made possible by the network governance character of the 
OECD and by decentralization of operational control within the OECD to is-
sue-based networks usually built by national government officials, are evident 
both in rulemaking and supervision.  As to rulemaking, whereas negotiations in 
the OECD on a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) failed in 1998, in 
part because the OECD was denounced for limiting the negotiations to states 
and keeping them confidential, the OECD succeeded in 2003 in adopting a 
Recommendation on environmental policies to be followed by national export 
credit agencies.  This process resembled the MAI process in not involving 
NGOs or business much at the OECD level, but in this case member states con-
sulted such groups extensively and publicly in their own polities, and the final 
text was quite widely supported.  A third approach is the OECD system for mu-
tual acceptance of data (MAD) on product testing, with its related test guide-
lines and principles of good laboratory practice.  This system is not highly publi-
cized, but involves large numbers of experts and specialist NGOs as well as 
national regulators in a process of continual information exchange and adjust-
ment.  As to supervision, the MAD rules are supervised primarily by the na-
tional authorities where a laboratory is located, but this is buttressed by queries 
from foreign regulators, and an informal system of mutual joint visits by foreign 
authorities.  Supervision of the Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises, which 
in prior decades was by an ineffective complaints process within the OECD, has 
since 2000 been decentralized with some success, each state being required to 
designate a national contact point to investigate alleged violations by corpora-
tions legally based in that state even if committed elsewhere. 
Walter Mattli and Tim Büthe, in their paper Global Private Governance: 
Lessons from a National Model of Setting Standards in Accounting,12 explain 
current and possible future administrative law-type principles in the work of the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB).  The IASB and its support-
ing (private) transnational governance structure were established in 2001, 
 
 11. 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 189 (Summer/Autumn 2005).  
 12. 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 225 (Summer/Autumn 2005). 
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largely by reference to a long-existing U.S. model.  Mattli and Büthe therefore 
present a detailed study of the U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) and its private governance structure, which since 1972 has exercised 
powers delegated by the federal Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to 
establish “generally accepted accounting principles” for businesses in the U.S.  
Governments delegate such standard-setting powers to private bodies for sev-
eral reasons, which include benefiting from their existing expertise, the com-
parative advantage of such bodies in future maintenance of the expertise neces-
sary to produce operable and efficient standards for fast-evolving industry 
practices, and the attractiveness to government politicians of being able to at-
tribute responsibilities for failures to an independent body.  Mattli and Büthe 
hypothesize that because the political costs of accounting standards failures 
(such as the collapse of Enron) usually outweigh the political benefits that come 
from the success of those standards, politicians might not want tight administra-
tive controls to ensure close accountability for the effectiveness of FASB regu-
lation of private entities: such strict accountability will make it more difficult to 
avoid political responsibility.  At a structural level, they focus particularly on a 
central problem: the FASB as an agent has multiple principals.  Those princi-
pals include both the private entities that established it and appoint its mem-
bers, and the SEC.  This problem is more acute in relation to the IASB, because 
the public principal is not a single entity but a multiplicity of national govern-
ment and E.U. agencies.  Mattli and Büthe note that shifts in the Zeitgeist, such 
as the spur that both the Enron failure and comparable scandals provided to re-
duce the dominance of big corporations in the FASB process, often lead to 
symbolic changes; but changes that truly affect later outcomes are likely to be 
much rarer given current structures and incentives. 
Kalypso Nicolaidis and Gregory Shaffer, in their paper Transnational Mu-
tual Recognition Regimes: Governance without Global Government,13 describe 
and advocate the existing horizontal systems in which one state recognizes 
(usually on a reciprocal basis) the applicability and adequacy of the standards 
or conformity and certification arrangements used in another state in order to 
trade in goods and services.  Their normative view is that, while democracy is 
likely to remain largely a national phenomenon, transnational governance can 
and should encompass some democratic elements, such as accountability.  They 
therefore focus on means that mutual recognition structures employ to achieve 
accountability horizontally between regulators of different states, and diago-
nally between regulators and foreign private actors—including through proce-
dural participation of non-citizens, requirements to issue reasoned decisions, 
and review mechanisms.  Their study highlights challenges for global adminis-
trative law arising from tensions between two different patterns of cooperation:  
a trust-based global governance emphasizing balances between market liberali-
zation and social regulation, and a harder-edged security orientation that has 
 
 13. 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263 (Summer/Autumn 2005). 
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intensified in the United States and in other states since September 2001.  They 
note, too, the inequities that vast power asymmetries produce in all forms of 
global governance, but defend mutual recognition as potentially more tolerant 
and less inequitable than some other governance models. 
Eyal Benvenisti’s essay, The Interplay Between Actors as a Determinant of 
the Evolution of Administrative Law in International Institutions,14 uses a public 
choice perspective to examine how global administrative law may be shaped by 
the interests of different actors—national governments, domestic economic and 
political interests, and global regime officials and institutions—and the interac-
tions among them in different institutional settings.  Benvenisti draws on the 
public choice literature in the United States, which explains administrative law 
arrangements primarily in terms of the political incentives of legislators to con-
trol executive decisions in order to deliver benefits to their political supporters, 
the pursuit of competition among domestic political interests, and the opportu-
nities of relatively insulated judges to play substantive roles in the context of 
stalemates among political forces.  He hypothesizes that the evolution of global 
administrative law will be influenced by the extent and nature of power dispari-
ties among states in different contexts; by competition between national gov-
ernments (who seek to exploit global decisionmaking to escape domestic politi-
cal constraints) and other domestic political actors; and by internal competition 
among actors, including tribunals, within global regimes.  Benvenisti draws on 
these factors in a schematic way to point to possible explanations of the devel-
opment (or lack of development) of administrative law in four settings: in the 
E.U., where the European Court of Justice and Court of First Instance have ex-
ploited legislative impasse and seized the initiative; in the WTO, where North 
and South have divided over increasing transparency and participation in Dis-
pute Settlement Body proceedings; in the U.N., with regard to judicial review of 
the legality of Security Council decisions; and in the International Court of Jus-
tice, with regard to its role in the evolution of international administrative law. 
He concludes that both the content of administrative law norms and the roles of 
the institutional actors who create them will reflect the balance of power within 
international institutions, in much the same way as comparable balances of 
power operate in domestic settings.  But he emphasizes that a comparative 
study must be wary of easy generalizations, and must be highly sensitive to the 
particular institutional and political context. 
Martin Shapiro’s concluding essay, “Deliberative,” “Independent” Technoc-
racy v. Democratic Politics: Will the Globe Echo the E.U.?,15 draws on experi-
ence with transnational regulation in the E.U. as an instructive example for con-
sidering similar global regulatory and governance issues. Shapiro emphasizes 
the inherent conflict between democratic political conceptions of administration 
and technocratic conceptions based on specialized expertise, noting prior efforts 
 
 14. 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 319 (Summer/Autumn 2005). 
 15. 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 341 (Summer/Autumn 2005). 
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to resolve or manage this dilemma, including, in the United States, New Deal 
innovations and a tradition of elite generalist civil servants.  He then considers 
whether developments in regulatory governance in the E.U., including the 
comitology process of decision by experts from national governments, the em-
brace of deliberative democracy, and the development of independent agencies, 
represent a solution to this dilemma in the global context that is superior to di-
rect bargaining among states and might provide a desirable model for transna-
tional administrative governance generally.  His answer is broadly negative.  In 
particular, he argues that in the E.U. concepts of deliberative democracy are be-
ing hijacked to legitimate non-democratic decision-making by technocrats with 
strong policy preferences of their own,  and thereby potentially also to enhance 
the policy leverage of  powerful private interests.  Shapiro concludes that the 
development of U.S.-style interest-representation models of administrative law 
implemented by courts can be a useful corrective to these tendencies, thereby 
giving a qualified endorsement to this strategy of global administrative law; but 
warns that this strategy can generate its own excesses as well. 
V 
TOWARD GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
Taken together, these symposium contributions provide substantial evi-
dence that a Global Administrative Law is emerging within a global administra-
tive space, and that this field of law and practice is worthy of study, theorizing, 
and more systematic and reflective development.  The contributions also con-
firm that this emerging field is highly variegated:  Global Administrative Law is 
emerging in different ways in different settings involving different types of re-
gimes and subjects of regulation, building different structures and procedures of 
accountability, to suit different needs, in response to different actors and incen-
tives.  Global Administrative Law is evolving through observation, critique, and 
borrowing across national legal systems that are increasingly interdependent.  
Different systems of national administrative law are also furnishing concepts for 
global regimes to borrow.16  Those regimes are also developing independent and 
novel responses to their specific institutional setting and accountability issues.  
This symposium represents a first effort to survey the different elements of 
these important trends and pose questions for further analysis and development 
of the field of Global Administrative Law. 
 
 16. See Wiener, Something Borrowed, supra note 3. 
